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DR. W. WEBBER KELLY*
T is not my intention to attempt to discuss in detail the exhaus-
tive subject of expert medical testimony. Such a detailed discus-
sion lies within the province of one trained in the law. My purpose
is merely to set forth some of the personal experiences and impres-
sions gained from 35 years of continued and frequent attendance
in court as a medical witness. My opportunity to observe the work-
ings of the wheels of justice has not been confined to the American
form of jurisprudence-it has also extended to the English system
from whence it derives. These long and tedious vigils in the halls
of justice have given me ample opportunity to observe and evaluate
court procedures in general, attorneys in particular and, incident-
ally, witnesses and jurors. It has been a most interesting psychol-
ogical study. Any references to the legal problems concerned with
the appearance of a medical witness in court are culled from a
somewhat thorough investigation of the literature on the subject.
The reason for this investigation was that I might be more intelli-
gently informed in the matter, and thus acquire a better under-
standing of my duties and responsibilities, as well as the limits
within which my testimony would be competent. It is my personal
belief that medical schools fail to devote sufficient attention to med-
ical jurisprudence insofar, at least, as it applies to the physician's
appearance in court. As a result, doctors called upon to testify as
experts are unaware of the bounds within which their testimony
may be given, as well as the latitude which permits them to give
full effect to their opinions.
Having lived under two flags, I have naturally compared the
American system of jurisprudence with that pertaining in British
courts of law. While deeply impressed with the pompous dignity,
the wigs and gowns, the medieval ceremonials and the more rapid
administration of justice which characterize the courts of England,
the conviction remains that notwithstanding its contrasting infor-
mality and comparative slowness of action, the American proce-
dures are more fitted to our democracy, and maintain a closer rela-
tion to the original idea of trial by one's peers. In the exercise of
broader powers and discretionary attitude of its presiding judges,
as well as the authority assumed in the conduct of the trial, com-
ments on the weight of evidence and instructions to the jury, the
* M.D., C.M., Fellow American College-of Surgeons, Green Bay, Wisconsin.
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federal court follows more closely the English pattern. Throughout
the British Empire, all courts of justice are held in very high regard.
Respect for the law and fear of the swift consequences of its viola-
tion dominate the mind of the average British citizen. Criticism of
the honesty of English jurists, in 6r outside the court room, is con-
sidered lese majeste, and is punished severely. The unfortunate in-
cidents which occasionally mar court trials in America tend to
shock the foreign observer. True, these incidents are isolated cases,
but, if the prestige of the courts and of the law is to be upheld and
preserved, all attorneys must at all times unite in maintaining the
high standards of their calling and continue to foster the dignity of
trials. To the lay observer, state court procedure appears to require
some modification. One cannot escape the conviction that judges
are handicapped in the performance of certain duties which appear
clearly to lie within their province. Legal limitation and fear of
judicial error are no doubt at fault. In marked contrast to the prac-
tice of our federal courts, state judges are deterred from comment-
ing upon the weight of evidence or the credibility of witnesses. It
follows that juries, admittedly ill equipped, receive little or no guid-
ance in these matters. This rule is not as rigidly adhered to in all of
the states. In California the trial court may comment upon the evi-
dence as a whole or upon the testimony or credibility of the witness
providing the courts comment is temperate and fairly made. Thus,
the comment of the court is not confined to a colorless recital by
way of summing up the facts. My information reveals that in fed-
eral trials, while the court may not direct a verdict of guilty in
criminal cases, it may at all times either directly or indirectly anal-
yze and comment upon the weight of evidence, and express its
views with regard to the testimony of witnesses leaving the ulti-
mate determination of the issues of fact fairly to the jury. The re-
action of the layman to these divergencies is that some middle
ground could be found which would expedite trial and promote
justice to a greater degree.
EXPERT TESTIMONY
The original purpose of expert testimony is obvious. It is per-
mitted in order to aid in the elucidation of certain issues in the case,
which elucidation is only possible by the testimony of witnesses
possessing special knowledge not to be obtained from the average
individual. The general rule is that opinion evidence is not admis-
sible ;' in other words, the witness must testify to facts within his
knowledge or those derived from his own perception. While it is
I Mundo, -The Expert Wite.ss, p. 1; JoNFs, EViDENCE, § 1242, p. 2283.
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true that from necessity the conclusions of certain witnesses are
admissible in matters of identity, quantity, value, time, distance,
velocity, heat, cold and others; as well as questions concerning va-
rious mental and moral aspects of humanity; namely, temper,
anger, fear, excitement, intoxication, veracity and general character:
such testimony is conclusion evidence and based upon evidentiary
facts. The general rule of opinion evidence is flagrantly broken in
the case of expert medical testimony. Such testimony permits the
consideration and credence by the jury of opinions and conclusions
based upon facts not necessarily within the knowledge or observa-
tions of the expert, but introduced in evidence by other witnesses
and presumed to be true. Its limitations appear to be very broad.
Once having qualified and while his competency remaining un-
challenged, it permits the witness by hypothesis and assumption of
facts either testified to at the time of his direct examination, or
upon promise of later proof, an expression of opinion not only as
to the injury or episode being the proximate cause of the present
disability and a belief as to the permanency of the litigant's present
condition; it also allows statement of belief as to the probable or
even possible future onset of remote effects.2 At this point, there-
fore, medical expert testimony enters the field of prophecy. It has
appeared to me that this matter of prophecy is at times permitted
to go too far. Belief as to probable exacerbati6ns or remote results
in the individual's mental and physical state without evidence that
such a development is already apparent, appears unreasonable and
is obviously double speculation.3 Thus, to say that any nervous dis-
order resulting from an injury or shock may at some distant future
time probably or possibly result in insanity, is to assume the role
of prophet. Medicine is a changing and progressive science, and the
last word in therapeutics today may not be the last word tomor-
row; however such speculation appears to be permissible.
HYPOTHETICAL QUESTION
Webster defines hypothesis as "A tentative theory or supposi-
tion provisionally adopted to explain certain facts, and to guide in
the investigation of others." This definition defines the mechanics,
at least, of hypothetical inquiry. As I understand it, the theory and
supposition must be in the case, and the facts supporting them must
2 Block v. Milwaukee Street R. Co., 89 Wis. 371, 61 N.W. 1101 (1895) ; Hanton
v. Omro, 122 Wis. 337, 99 N.W. 1051 (1904); Faber v. Reiss Coal Co., 124
Wis. 554, 102 N.W. 1049 (1905); Sundquist v. Mad. R. R., 197 Wis. 83, 221
N.W. 392 (1928).
SCiWEITZER, NEGLIGE-NCE AcTioNs, p. 376, n. 1; Griswold v. N. Y. etc. R. C.,
115 N.Y. 61. 21 N.E. 226 (1889).
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have been testified to, before a basis may be established for the
propounding of the hypothetical question. The ground work for
such question is, of course, a simple matter for the attorney whose
purpose it is to offer it later in the trial. In framing such an interro-
gation a great deal of care and effort must be spent. To attempt to
recite extemporaneously the facts desired is often a confusing and
unsatisfactory method of handling it. While in court I usually hear
two constant objections by opposing counsel to the hypothetical
questions submitted to me. First, that the question recites facts not
shown in the evidence, and second, that the question -does not
contain all of the facts in the case. A promise to introduce the miss-
ing facts later in the case appears to be sufficient to invalidate the
first objection. As to the second, it would appear that the question
need not include any particular number of facts, it may assume any
one or more facts whatsoever, and need not cover all of the factors
which the questioner alleges in his case. The questioner is entitled
to the witness' opinion in any combination of facts that he may
choose. It is often convenient and even necessary to obtain that
opinion upon a state of facts falling short of what he or his oppon-
ent expects to prove because the questioner cannot tell how much
of the testimony the jury will accept; ... For reasons of principle
then, and to some extent of policy, the natural conclusion would be
that the questioner need not cover in his hypothesis the entire body
of testimony put forward on that point by him or by the opponent,
but may take as limited a selection as he pleases and obtain an
opinion on that basis. Such is the orthodox doctrine as applied to
most courts. 4 On the other hand, other authorities are of the opin-
ion that generally speaking a hypothetical question should state all
the facts relevant to the formation of an opinion ... there is no
exclusive formula . ..and the matter of form is largely discre-
tionary to the trial court5
At this point may I, as a layman, offer a word of caution as to
the length of the hypothetical question. Often one hears a question
covering several pages of foolscap and containing so much material
that the attorney himself cannot remember it. Under these circum-
stances it is difficult to believe that the jury at its conclusion is in
any better position. Limited to essential facts, clearly and intelli-
gently cited, upon which the jury may know the premises upon
which the opinion is to be given, it appears to be more effective.
One prominent trial lawyer tells me that he adopts the rule of writ-
ing the question carefully and as concisely as possible, committing
4 1 WiGMoRE, EvmErcE, § 682, p. 778.
5 3 JoNEs, EvIDENCE, p. 2427-28. . -..
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it to memory and then tearing up the written version. His argu-
ment is that unless he can remember it, he is certain that the jury
cannot do so. The effect of medical expert testimony upon the jury
has intrigued me. After speaking to many jurors, I am now con-
vinced that its effect is greater than I formerly believed. This, of
course, depends a great deal upon the manner in which this evi-
dence is given, and is concerned with the apparant honesty of the
witness, the firmness of his conclusions and, above all, his employ-
ment of language as intelligible as possible to laymen serving as
jurors. Many expert witnesses forget that the jury exists, and ad-
dress their answers to the questioner. His replies should be directly
aimed at the jury, and he should, if necessary, change his position
in the witness chair in order that they may hear distinctly what he
says.
At this point let me discuss that individual who is at once the
trial and despair of judges and opposing counsel, and the white
haired boy of the trial attorney who engages his services.
THE ExPERT WITNESS
It must be born in mind that a physician who qualifies as an expert
must expect to be judged by a different standard than the physician who
gives evidence as an ordinary witness. By this is meant that from
the latter we have no right to expect more than average knowledge
of the issues in the case. From the former we have a reason to de-
mand an opinion based upon a larger personal experience and scien-
tific familiarity with the issues involved. An interesting point oc-
curs in connection with this latter statement. Objection may be
raised to an expert witness as to the bookish source of his knowl-
edge; first, because it implies a lack of skill and experience as af-
fecting his expert capacity for judgment; and second, because it
involves accepting as a knower of a given fact one who has not
really observed it for himself, but is trusting in the opinions of
others. In other words, it is an objection against the witness' ex-
perience on the quality of his knowledge. To deny the competency
of a physician who does not know his facts from personal observa-
tion in similar cases is to reject medical testimony almost in its
entirety ... Medical science is a mass of transmitted data; general
relations are rare which are the result of one man's personal obser-
vations exclusively; and the law cannot expect its petitioners to obtain
these rare persons.6
There appears to be no precise general rule as to how the skill
of a witness must be acquired. According to decisions in Michigan
61 WIGMOR., EviDEN E, § 687, p. 782.
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a witness may express an opinion upon certain matters even if his
knowledge is derived from study alone.7 Wigmore agrees with the
above rule, feeling apparently that the knowledge however acquired
is a question relating only to the weight of the evidence given.8
The Supreme Court of Wisconsin holds that the opinion of an ex-
pert must, in addition to knowledge, be derived from experience.
The logic of this position is that since books themselves cannot be
read in evidence, extracts from them should not be permitted from
the lips and memory of the expert. 9 I raise this question because of
an occurrence in a personal injury suit within my knowledge. The
question involved a case of a rare pathological condition of the eye
in which an expert from Milwaukee was called to testify by the
plaintiff. Upon admission that the witness had never seen a similar
case in his experience, a plea of lack of competency was upheld and
the witness was not permitted to testify. The decision of the trial
court as to .competency lies within its own discretion, and unless
founded upon some error of law, serious mistake or abuse of dis-
cretion, its ruling is not reversible.I0 Relative to competency, it
must be remembered that section 147.14(2) (Wis. Stat. 1941) provides
"that no person shall have the right to testify in a professional capacity
except when duly licensed in Wisconsin; except those licenced in other
states may testify in Wisconsin, when such testimony is necessary to
establish the rights of residents of this state in a judicial proceeding
and expert testimony of licensed practitioners of this state sufficient for
the purpose is not available.
Another difficulty encountered by the expert witness is the ob-
jection that his opinion given as the result of his examination of
the plaintiff or defendant, as the case may be, is in part based upon
hearsay; in that he must rely upon the patient's own statements as
to the history and symptoms and that such hearsay testimony is
not valid. Such limitation is apparently the rule in Wisconsin, al-
though in other states the rigidity of this practice does not pertain.
As Wigmore logically states, the exclusion of information so ob-
tained and its basis in the formation of the expert's opinion does in
strictness exclude all medical testimony based upon personal exam-
ination." Thus the witness is confined in testifying only as to the
objective symptoms. A qualified expert can, however, overcome
7 People v. Thacker, 108 Mich. 652, 66 N.W 562 (1896).
8 1 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE, § 569.
9 Soquet v. State, 72 Wis. 659, 40 N.W. 391 (1888) ; Zuesdorf v. Grotsky, 195
Wis. 253, 218 N.W. 186 (1928).
103 JONES, EVIDENCE, § 1317-1318.
I1 WIGMORIE, EVIDENCE, § 688, p. 783-784... "Those who object to testimony
of the sort where considered must expect to surrender the medical witness
stand to veterinary surgeons exclusively."
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this handicap by enumerating many of the subjective findings and
by increasing -his powers of observation and giving proper expres-
sion to them. It would appear to be a case of much ado about noth-
ing as an experienced attorney can readily present the history,
symptoms and any other missing facts in hypothetical form for the
expert's conclusions.
PREREQUISITES FOR THE MEDICAL EXPERT
It goes without saying that he should be absolutely honest and
unbiased in his testimony, and thoroughly familiar with the medi-
cal aspects of the case in which he is testifying. This should be done
by preparing himself by looking up the general literature on the
matter and for his own information familiarizing himself with the
opinions of authorities who may have written upon the subject. To
this must be added his professional background and standing in the
community in which the action rests, or his medical reputation
throughout the state if he is from the outside. He should display
ready understanding and even anticipation of the questions pro-
pounded, and possess sufficient ability to take care of himself as far
as possible without protection from the attorney engaging his ser-
vices. He must, however, avoid the delusion that he is a medical
jurist. He should at all costs retain great composure and control of
his temper, and be definitely courteous and patient under cross ex-
amination. He should, as previously stated, speak distinctly and
slowly, and in terms as intelligible as possible to the jury. Techni-
cal terms, unless explained, are lost upon jurors and nullify the ef-
fect of his testimony. In enumerating the qualifications I would
emphasize preparation. To my mind this is very essential. One
should never enter a lawsuit as an expert witness without thor-
oughly acquainting himself not only with the gross medical facts
involved, but with the anatomy, physiology and other allied sub-
jects connected with them. My personal preparation includes an
effort to anticipate the possible questions that may be asked me by
the opposing attorney. Needless to say most of these questions are
never asked, but should they be, I expect to be in a position to have
a ready answer. It may appear paradixical, but it is nevertheless
true that many intelligent and well educated physicians fail to make
good witnesses. This results from shyness, fear, or lack of ability
to express themselves logically. On the other hand, many physicians
of mediocre attainments, with alert minds and plenty of self assur-
ance may make a good showing. The danger in the latter case lies
in the possibility of disaster at the hands of an attorney who is well
prepared medically and with experience in this type of cases. Wise
[Vol. 27
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cracking and other forms of subtle humor should be strictly
avoided by the witness. On the other hand an attitude of abject
humility or what may be termed the "Uriah Heap complex" is equally
to be deplored.
TE QUESTION oF PARTISANSHIP
The question of partisanship, as evidenced by the invariable con-
flict of opinion by experts on both sides of the case, has often been
discussed. A physician should refuse to testify in cases where any
doubt exists in his mind as to the correctness of the position as-
sumed by attorneys or other medical witnesses. I am glad to say
that having advanced my views and objections to the medical-the-
ory of the case, no attorney has ever insisted in his demands for my
services or attempted to influence my convictions or decisions to
testifying. As a general rule no one has a right to question the hon-
esty of the medical witness. It is true that one may unconsciously
become partisan, due, no doubt, to the fact that he is certain that
whatever conclusions he testifies to will be contradicted by the doc-
tor testifying on the opposite side. There may be, and are, many
honest differences of opinion in medical matters, and it is very hard
to get away from one's own convictions. Some witnesses become
dogmatic and are unwilling to admit that any opinion other than
their own can possibly be correct. The contradictory form of expert
testimony as evidenced by those testifying on opposite sides of the
case has become proverbial, and several suggestions have been
made for its correction.
I find that under Section 357.12 of the Wisconsin Statutes, the
judge of the trial court in criminal cases may, after notice to the
parties and a hearing, appoint one or more disinterested qualified
experts, not exceeding three, to testify at the trial. Under this sec-
tion, these experts are-required to subscribe to a special oath and
their compensation is fixed by the court and paid by the county
upon the court's order constituting a part of the costs of the action.
They are, of course, subject to cross examination by both parties
who may also summon other expert witnesses at the trial. Why
this practice cannot be extended, even in modified form, in civil
cases is hard to fathom. For many years efforts by eminent mem-
bers of the bar and the several professions have endeavored to have
enacted by the various legislatures, laws authorizing the court to
appoint its own experts, especially when there appears, as is fre-
quently the case, wide differences between the experts for the
plaintiff and defendant, differences which tend to completely con-
fuse and confound both the court and the jury.
19431
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In certain foreign countries, as in Germany for example, the ex-
pert is chosen by the court from a list of scientific and highly quali-
fied members of the various professions. A penalty is attached for
disregarding the summons, and the commonwealth provides a- mod-
erate fixed compensation, together with expenses, for appearance
and testimony in court. The medical expert's position becomes
thereby an official one; in fact he is thus made an officer of the
court. It is regarded an honor and distinction to be so designated,
and there is attendant on the office every courtesy and dignity to
which its responsibilities entitle it. The utmost care is observed in
the selection of physicians and surgeons as official experts, so that
only men of known special scientific attainments, personal integrity
and possessing the ability to clarify complex problems, are chosen 2
Section 1871 of the California Code of Civil Procedure provides:
"When it shall be made to appear to any court or judge thereof,
either before or during the trial of any action or proceeding, such
court or judge may, on motion of any party, or on motion of such
court or judge, appoint one or more experts to investigate and tes-
tify at the trial of such action or proceeding relative to the matter
or matters as to which such expert evidence is, or will be, required,
and such court or judge may fix the compensation of such expert."
The commission on the administration of justice in New York State
has.proposed similar legislation, and it would appear that the trend
is definitely in the direction of the appointment of experts by the
courts.
QUALIFICATIONs ADMITTED
I believe that many attorneys err -in failing to emphasize the
qualifications of their expert. "Qualifications admitted" has come to
have a familiar sound to me. This short cut method of qualifying
an expert has two principal objections. First, the counsel whose
witness you are misses an opportunity to impress the jury with any
qualifications including medical training, membership in recognized
medical societies, period of practice, general experience; as well as
familiarity with the issues in similar cases. Secondly, "It must be
born in mind that once having stipulated the witnesses qualifica-
tions the opposing attorney is barred from later attempting to im-
peach the competency of the expert and complaint cannot be made
on appeal that he was not qualified."
- California State Bar Journal, May, 1937.
13 McGuire v. Baird, 9 Cal. (2d) 353, 70 P. (2d) 915 (1937).
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CROSS EXAMINATIONS OF EXPERTS
Unless properly prepared the average attorney is gambling with
odds in the cross examination of a competent medical expert in-
sofar, at least, as the technical medical details of the case are con-
cerned. Attorneys frequently engaged in personal injury cases are
of course an exception to this statement. Proper preparation with
the aid of some competent medical man prior to the cross examina-
tion is imperative. I do not mean y this that the opposing attorney
should entirely refrain from cross examination. Inconsistencies and
contradictions and conclusions clearly illogical should be questioned
and questioned severely.
"YES OR No"
The medical witness is frequently instructed to answer a ques-
tion "yes" or "no." Compliance with such a demand may be impos-
sible. If such is the case, the witness should so state. If ordered by
the court to do so without being permitted to give the reasons for
his answer, it is a simple matter for counsel to ask him on redirect
to give the reasons for such an answer, and to explain the conclu-
sions or premises which required him to do so. Such an opportunity
cannot be withheld.
The common law rule is that scientific books may not be read
to the jury as evidence, because the statements therein contained
are wanting in the sanctity of an oath, are made by one not present,
and who is not liable to cross examination. While the common law
rule has been modified by statute in many states to allow certain
scientific books to be received in evidence, the rule of exclusion
still prevails as to medical books.14 Mortality tables for estimating
of the probable life of a party, the given age, chronological tables,
tables of weights, measures and currency and the like, are admis-
sible to prove facts of general notoriety and interest in connection
with such subjects as may be involved in the trial of a cause.' But
medicine is not considered as one of the exact sciences: it is of the
character of inductive sciences which are based on data which each
successive year may correct and expand, so that what is considered
a sound induction last year may be considered an unsound one this
year' 6 In some jurisdictions it has been held that the medical wit-
ness may reinforce his opinion from a stated condition by showing
that certain textbooks upon the subject are in accord with his
views.' 7 Such a practice in my opinion is dangerous, for the witness
1M UNDo, THE EXPERT WITNESS, p. 87.
15 Wagar v. Schuyler, 1 Wend. 553 (1827).
'16 WHARTON, EVIDEN cE, § 665.
'7 Louisville R. Co. v. Howell, 147 Ind. 266, 45 N.E. 584 (1896); Pinney v.
Cahill, 48 Mich. 586, 12 N.W. 862 (1882).
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may be discredited upon cross examination from extracts read from
such authorities and contradictory statements or those subject to
varying interpretations are to be found in the same textbooks. It is
generally held, however, that the use of medical texts to prove a
fact in issue is improper. It has been my lot on several occasions to
face attempts by opposing counsel to read statements from text-
books by authorities about whose standing there could be no ques-
tion, and then requested to state whether I agreed or disagreed
with the theories they embrace. A competent witness will refuse
to be drawn into any such trap. Counsel must be expressly limited
in references to only such treaties as have been used or referred to
by the witness upon his direct examination.'8 The witness may
refresh his memory by referring to X-rays, charts made by him or
under his direction and notes taken by him at the time when the
matter was fresh in his memory. The rule respecting notes is that
the witness is allowed to refresh his memory by anything written
by himself or under his direction at the time when the fact oc-
curred, immediately thereafter or at any time when the fact is fresh
in his memory. Unless necessary, notes should not be used. If notes
are used, they must be produced so that the adverse party may see
them and cross examine the witness upon them as he chooses. They
may be read to the jury.'9
Before leaving the subject of expert testimony, may I suggest
the abandonment of a policy which I think is undesirable. I have
reference to having counsel's own medical witness sitting behind
him and coaching him during the examination of the other attor-
ney's medical expert. Physicians regard this as not being strictly
ethical, and there is no question in my mind that it has a distinctly
injurious psychological effect upon the jury. Not only is it unsatis-
factory in technique, but it is an admission of counsel's own weak-
ness, and gives the impression of not being good sportsmanship.
THE LAWYER FROM THE LAYMAN'S VIEWPOINT
May I begin by saying that collectively and individually I hold
the members of the legal profession in the highest regard. In my
contacts with them throughout the state, I have been impressed by
their high character and honesty of purpose. It is my belief that
the State of Wisconsin is outstanding in the caliber and professional
integrity of its Bar. This is in great part due to the judiciary, for
the character and ability of the judge reflect upon the members of
18 Schweitzer, op. cit., p. 386-387, n. 1, 388, 389.
3. Mundo, op. cit., p. 47; Braxten v. Brown, 197 Minn. 511, 267 N.W. 489 (1936);
Wright v. Upsilon, 303 Ill. 120, 135 N.E. 208 (1922) ; People v. Schepps, 217
Mich. 406, 186 N.E. 508, 21 A.L.R. 658 (1922).
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his circuit. Among lawyers there appears to me to be a great degree
of consideration for each other and a large absence of the petty
jealousy that exists in other professions, including the medical
fraternity. Personally, I have experienced nothing but courtesy and
kindness from the Bar as a whole, and while I know that to many
of them I have at times been very trying, they have never failed to
treat me with respect and consideration. Therefore, anything that
I may say will indicate no desire on my part to be disrespectful or
unkind. It is sometimes interesting, however, and even profitable
to see ourselves as others see us. Hence these observations of a
layman.
PREPARATION
One thing is apparent with some attorneys, and that is their
lack of preparation. This arises either from the fact that they are
too busy and have insufficient help, or from neglect. They enter
court without definite strategic plans and even familiarity with the
legal angles involved, as well as an absence of understanding as to
what their own witness will testify to. In some cases cross exami-
nation has all the ear marks of a fishing expedition and some of
them should be members of the Isaac Walton League. Many attor-
neys of mediocre ability can make a confrere with definitely greater
legal experience look sick by the simple expedient of thoroughly
preparing his case. The most successful members of the Bar of my
acquaintance are usually those with whom preparation is a ritual.
I would much prefer not to-be associated with the attorney who
calls me up the night before a case to discuss the important matter
of the medical testimony. On the other hand, it is a joy to work
with one who is sufficiently interested to discuss these details two
or three times before putting me on the witness stand.
OVER EXAmiNATION
Another matter that has intrigued me greatly is the yen some
attorneys possess for over examination. How frequently one sees
witnesses tied up completely and with the record in excellent shape,
only to have the effect of their answers destroyed by continued
questioning. Having obtained an answer that is entirely satisfac-
tory to his case, some attorneys persist in asking the same question
in several different forms, until finally the answer is so modified as
to be hardly recognizable. A satisfactory answer is an asset worth
preserving. Why attempt to paint the lily? Equal danger appears
to lie in failing to sufficiently examine the witness. This was
brought forcibly to my mind in a murder case in which I was re-
tained by the state. An eminent psychiatrist and excellent witness
19431
THE MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
was on the stand. In spite of advice to the contrary, the prosecutor
read to him two long detailed hypothetical questions, and instructed
him to answer "yes" or "no" to both. His strategy was then to turn
him over to counsel for the defense in the full expectation that he
would be cross examined, and in this way enabled to elaborate his
answers. These were the only two questions asked him. The result
was unfortunate. The attorney for the defense simply said, "No
questions, doctor" and the witness left the stand. Thus the testi-
mony of an outstanding expert, brought many miles for the specific
purpose of tearing the defense apart, was completely thrown away.
Moral: don't depend on the other fellow to try your case.
Another thing that is noticeable to an onlooker is the eternal
leading that goes on in the examination of witnesses. My rough
guess is that a large majority of the questions asked are leading.
This has become such a habit with some attorneys that when they
are called on it, they are often at a complete loss to frame the ques-
tion in a non-leading manner, and are often aided by the court in
their dilemma.
CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTORS
A psychological understanding of the judge, as well as the jury
would appear essential. Many attorneys acquire psychological
knowledge from experience, but often at the expense of many dis-
asters that might have been avoided. No doubt legal psychology is
a part of the curriculum of every law school. If not, it should be,
and also emphasized. Some attorneys seem to have an affinity for
objecting and objecting eternally. To one who is not versed in legal
lore, most of these objections appear to be trivial. An experienced
trial attorney of my acquaintance, when asked by me why he did
not object to a certain question, informed me that no matter how
irrelevant or immaterial, he never objected so long as the question
did no harm to his case. He felt that he got along with the judge a
great deal better by following this rule. It is used by some attor-
neys to confuse and confound opposing counsel. Whether this is
effective or not I do not know. It is not only the constant objec-
tions which delay the trial and tire the judge, but the exceptions to
the judge's ruling one occasionally hears that are irksome and
annoying. Since exceptions are, in this state deemed taken to ad-
verse rulings, they are unnecessary-why rub his Honor's fur the
wrong way?
With the passing of the years, it has been noticeable that the
explosive and noisy type of oratory is gradually fading from the
scene; it seems to have disappeared with the crinoline and the polit-
ical torch light parades. Occasionally one still hears it, but it has
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lost much of its former effectiveness. Side remarks made by one
attorney to another, remarks that are intended to be humerous but
which are frequently bitter and vindictive are still with us. Beyond
causing momentary amusement, they have little favorable effect
upon the average juror. This type of vaudeville would never be per-
mitted in an English court room. It tends to lower the dignity of
the court. Some judges, strange to say, are very tolerant in this
regard.
CROss EXAMINATION, MATERIAL AND OTHERWISE
An expert witness needs a long memory, for one is not infre-
quently confronted with prophecies made at previous trials. A
somewhat amusing, but nevertheless tragic, incident occurred a
short time ago which illustrates this point. It occurred in federal
court in a case with which I was associated. One of the witnesses
for the government, an eminent and distinguished professor of one
of our large universities, was on the stand. The opposing counsel
(with no text books in sight) read to him a long statement which
he had written on his scratch pad. The question covered a theory
closely related to the issue in the case. When he had finished he
asked the witness whether he did not believe that the statement
was a fair one, and covered the situation thoroughly. The witness
could hardly wait for the completion of the statement and question,
and immediately replied, "I utterly disagree with that theory-in
my opinion it is not correct." The attorney looked at him intently
for a moment and then said, "You are sure, doctor, that you dis-
agree entirely with that statement ?" The witness answered, "Yes."
"That is strange, doctor, because that is an exact copy of a para-
graph contained in a text book of which you are the author, and
which is in general use among medical students and practioners."
The judge immediately called for the book, which was produced,
and the witness was required to read the paragraph in question and
state whether it did not coincide word for word with the excerpt
which had been read to him.
I have had my full share of questions that are irrelevant and
immaterial. It has often amazed me not only that these questions
should be asked, but that they should be permitted by the trial
judge. Some of them call for a facetious answer, although this
should be avoided if possible. The classic answer of Dr. Joseph
Collins of New York is an example: Q. "As a matter of fact, doctor,
you are an alienist pure and simple?" A. "Yes, an alienist mod-
erately pure, but not simple." Let me quote one or two irrelevant
queries which come to my mind. Q. "You testify in all of Attorney
Jones's cases, don't you doctor ?" A. "I am not in a position to an-
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swer that question intelligently, because I am not aware of how
many cases Attorney Jones has. Q. "How far North, how far South,
how far East and how far West have you traveled to testify for
Attorney Smith?" Where is the relevancy in a question of this
type? Q. "You are a personal friend of the attorney on the other
side, are you not doctor?" The implication in such a question is
obvious, and the answer equally illuminating. The question as to
the size of the fee the expert witness expects to get in a given case,
while not frequent, occassionally present itself. Its object is evi-
dently to demonstrate interest and bias, and in that respect is, of
course, proper. In the majority of cases, the matter of compensa-
tion has not been discussed between the attorney and the witness
at the time of the question, but an answer to this effect does not
appear to be sufficient. Then comes the query, "How much are you
in the habit of receiving for testifying in court ?" This would appear
irrelevant, as the compensation received in some previous trial has
certainly no bearing on the present case. The best way to handle
this question is to answer it frankly and responsively, and let the
matter end there. Occasionally one runs into trick questions and
the witness must be on his guard. In a certain case I had testified
that in my opinion the injury in question was permanent, and I
knew of no treatment or operation that could correct it. On cross
examination the opposing attorney asked me these questions -
"You say, doctor, that nothing can be done to cure this man ?" My
answer was "Yes"--"You don't believe that Christian Science
could do anything for him ?". My answer was-"I really couldn't
say, for though I have a deep respect for Christian Science, I am
not familiar with its operation in conditions of this nature." This
apparently did not satisfy him. "Will you say positively that Chris-
tian Science could not cure -him ?" My answer was-"I would make
no such statement, because as I have already stated, I am not famil-
iar with it, although I have heard of some remarkable results that
it has accomplished." As I stepped down from the stand and passed
the attorney I whispered to him--"How many Christian Scientists
have you on the jury ?" He smiled and answered--"Only two." This
was a clear case of fishing, but my legal friend had forgotten the
repeated admonition and cardinal rule for fishermen, enunciated by
the late Isaac Walton,-"First, know your fish." (-the gentleman
apparently mistook me for a sucker.) The question was, of course,
improper and should have been-objected to. No expert of one school
of healing can be questioned about any other school with which he
is unfamiliar.
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My purpose in presenting this paper has been to record some of
the experiences, impressions and reactions derived from a close
observation of court procedures over a period of many years. It is
only proper that a medical expert witness should be concerned with
those phases of the law regarding competency, the use of medical
texts, opinion evidence, hypothetical inquiry and other legal ques-
tions which directly affect him as a witness. Such knowledge, even
though lacking in profundity, is in my opinion necessary to enable
a medical expert to perform his function intelligently and effec-
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